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AFFIRMATIVE IMMUNITY:  A LITIGATION-
BASED APPROACH TO CURB APPELLATE 
COURTS’ RAISING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SUA 
SPONTE 
Michael E. Beyda* 
 
Qualified immunity, to put it simply, provides public officials with 
immunity from civil lawsuits if they have violated an individual’s 
constitutional rights under their official authority and those rights were not 
“clearly established” at the time of the official’s actions.  The doctrine has 
evolved into an elaborate framework that has plagued civil rights plaintiffs, 
as well as courts, for decades.  Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, 
and affirmative defenses are waived if not raised appropriately by the 
defendant.  Moreover, issues that are not properly raised before the trial 
court, including affirmative defenses, are generally not considered for the 
first time on appeal.  Nevertheless, courts have a long history of defying this 
general rule, and qualified immunity is no exception.  This Note examines the 
historical development of and rationales for the qualified immunity doctrine, 
the purposes of affirmative defenses, and the reasons for the general rule that 
appellate courts do not consider issues for the first time on appeal.  
Additionally, this Note summarizes an inconsistent trend among appellate 
courts, some of which raise qualified immunity sua sponte, while others hold 
that qualified immunity is waived if not raised at the trial court appropriately.  
After recognizing that the original goal of qualified immunity was to prevent 
public officials from enduring the burdens of litigation and that appellate 
courts generally have discretion to consider issues for the first time on 
appeal, this Note proposes a two-part solution to balance these values.  This 
Note’s proposed framework returns qualified immunity to its original 
purpose and resolves the current inconsistency among appellate courts, 
while allowing appellate courts to raise issues for the first time on appeal 
when they consider it appropriate.  The framework also prevents appellate 
courts from raising qualified immunity sua sponte inappropriately, which 
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can unduly burden civil rights plaintiffs and make it harder for them to 
recover damages if their constitutional rights have been violated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an age of polarized politics,1 a growing and surprising ideological 
alliance is emerging to defeat a common legal enemy:  qualified immunity.2  
The qualified immunity doctrine allows public officials to avoid civil liability 
for discretionary decisions they make in the line of duty.3  The U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted the qualified immunity doctrine after police officers were sued 
in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arrests made pursuant 
to a statute that was later ruled unconstitutional.4  The Court held that an 
affirmative defense of good faith was available to the officers, “immunizing” 
them from suit if they acted pursuant to their authority in good faith.5  Hence, 
the qualified immunity doctrine was born.  The Court’s primary concern was 
to ensure that police officers (and, by extension, other public officials) would 
be able to do their jobs effectively without the threat of civil liability hanging 
over them.6 
Since then, however, the qualified immunity doctrine has snowballed into 
an elaborate objective framework7 that makes it harder for civil rights 
plaintiffs to sue for damages when their constitutional rights are violated.8  
 
 1. See John Avlon, Opinion, Polarization Is Poisoning America.  Here’s an Antidote, 
CNN (Nov. 1, 2019, 1:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/opinions/fractured-states-
of-america-polarization-is-killing-us-avlon/index.html [https://perma.cc/4WH8-RP87]. 
 2. Press Release, NAACP Legal Def. Fund, LDF Joins Cross-Ideological Coalition in 
Submitting an Amicus Brief in Case Challenging Qualified Immunity (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Qualified-Immunity-Cato-Amicus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MK9-Y4N7] (describing a recent alliance of cross-ideological groups, 
ranging from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to the Alliance Defending Freedom, filing a 
joint amicus brief calling for the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the qualified immunity 
doctrine). 
 3. See Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 403–04 (S.D. Miss. 2020). 
 4. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 550, 557 (1967). 
 5. Id. at 557. 
 6. Id. at 555 (explaining that police officers should not be forced to “choose between 
being charged with dereliction of duty if” they do not take a certain action “and being mulcted 
in damages” if they do). 
 7. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (noting that the qualified immunity 
doctrine “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the 
legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 
526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999))). 
 8. Est. of Smart v. City of Wichita, No. 14-2111, 2018 WL 3744063, at *1, *18 n.174 
(D. Kan. Aug. 7, 2018) (citing Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting)) (expressing concern that the current qualified immunity doctrine is moving 
federal courts “toward fully insulating police officers from trial”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
951 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2020). 
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Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,9 it serves as a powerful 
legal weapon for public officials when they are sued personally for damages 
under § 1983.  As a general rule, defendants must raise affirmative defenses 
at trial, or they risk waiving them.10  But what if qualified immunity is raised 
sua sponte11—for the first time on appeal—by an appellate court when it 
otherwise would be waived? 
This predicament highlights a fundamental disagreement that has quietly 
developed in the lower courts over the past several decades.  Affirmative 
defenses are typically waived if not raised in the trial court first before an 
appeal is taken.12  If an appellate court raises qualified immunity sua sponte, 
this can create several dilemmas.  First, doing so flouts fundamental 
principles of civil procedure by departing from general waiver rules and 
contradicts the very nature of the appellate court system in the United States, 
which is to correct the errors of lower courts.13  Second, and more 
importantly, doing so can cause significant hardships for civil rights plaintiffs 
suing under § 1983, as qualified immunity is already a difficult legal hurdle 
to clear.14 
For example, police officers arrested Jonathan Crowell on July 18, 1998, 
during a protest in Idaho.15  Police officers arrested Crowell after he refused 
to consent to a search of his knapsack simply because it looked heavy and 
bulky.16  Crowell sued the police officers under § 1983 for false arrest in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.17  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the arrest was unconstitutional.18  However, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte 
raised qualified immunity and held that the police officer was entitled to the 
doctrine’s protection.19 
This case illustrates the dangers of appellate courts considering issues sua 
sponte, especially in the qualified immunity context.  Not only does raising 
qualified immunity sua sponte contravene the general rule that issues not 
raised in the trial court below are waived,20 it can bar civil rights plaintiffs 
 
 9. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 11. When using the terminology “sua sponte” or “considering an issue raised for the first 
time on appeal,” this Note is generally referring to two ways appellate courts raise issues sua 
sponte.  The first is when judges themselves raise an issue for the first time on appeal. See, 
e.g., Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 845 n.23 (9th Cir. 2003).  The second is 
when the parties themselves raise the issue for the first time on appeal and the judge considers 
it for the first time. See, e.g., United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1982).  
This Note uses this terminology interchangeably. 
 12. See generally Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 
FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1958). 
 13. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing the history of affirmative defenses and the role of 
appellate courts in the United States). 
 14. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 832–33. 
 16. Id. at 836. 
 17. Id. at 833. 
 18. Id. at 844–45. 
 19. Id. at 845 n.23, 848. 
 20. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing waiver rules and sua sponte actions by appellate 
courts). 
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from recovering damages from public officials even when the alleged 
misconduct actually violates their constitutional rights.21  This is one of a few 
examples of appellate courts raising qualified immunity sua sponte.22  Other 
appellate courts, however, hold steadfast to the general rule that they will not 
consider the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for the first time on 
appeal and that it is instead waived if not raised properly before the trial 
court.23  This inconsistency between appellate courts may lead to disparate 
results for civil rights plaintiffs depending on which circuit adjudicates their 
§ 1983 claims.24 
This Note explores whether appellate courts can, or should, raise the 
affirmative defense of qualified immunity sua sponte.  Part I of this Note 
analyzes the legal frameworks surrounding these issues by analyzing three 
foundational legal regimes:  (1) the history and jurisprudential development 
of the qualified immunity doctrine and its underlying policy concerns, (2) the 
origins and purposes of affirmative defenses, and (3) how sua sponte actions 
by appellate courts relate to the origins of the appellate court system in the 
United States. 
Part II surveys circuit court decisions and outlines the inconsistency 
among lower courts as to whether qualified immunity can be raised sua 
sponte on appeal.  Finally, Part III proposes an alternative two-part rule that 
will limit how and when appellate courts can raise qualified immunity sua 
sponte.  The proposed rule will balance the goals of the qualified immunity 
doctrine, the purposes of affirmative defenses, and the historical role of 
appellate courts. 
I.  FIRST PRINCIPLES:  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, 
AND SUA SPONTE ACTIONS 
When an appellate court raises qualified immunity sua sponte, it implicates 
three crucial elements of law:  the qualified immunity doctrine itself, the 
purposes of affirmative defenses and their intricate waiver rules, and the 
integrity of our appellate court system.  Because qualified immunity is an 
affirmative defense25 that might be subject to waiver if not raised 
appropriately,26 appellate courts risk harming civil rights plaintiffs whose 
constitutional rights have been violated by resuscitating waived affirmative 
defenses that strongly favor public officials.27  Part I.A documents the early 
 
 21. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Graves and how the Ninth Circuit granted a police 
officer qualified immunity after raising the issue sua sponte, even though the court found a 
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights). 
 22. See infra Part II.A (analyzing appellate court cases that have raised qualified immunity 
sua sponte). 
 23. See infra Part II.B (analyzing appellate court cases that refused to raise qualified 
immunity sua sponte). 
 24. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–13, Hamner v. Burls, 141 S. Ct. 611 (2020) 
(mem.) (No. 19-1291). 
 25. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). 
 26. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing waiver rules). 
 27. See infra Part I.A.3 (noting how qualified immunity is generally difficult for plaintiffs 
to overcome). 
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origins of the qualified immunity doctrine and its evolution over the past few 
decades.  Part I.B explores the common-law foundations of affirmative 
defenses.  Then, Part I.C analyzes the origins of the appellate court system in 
the United States and whether sua sponte actions by appellate courts are 
consistent with our system of adjudicating appeals. 
A.  Qualified Immunity 
If a public official (for example, a police officer) acts unlawfully and 
violates an individual’s constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows that 
aggrieved person to sue the official for civil damages.28  Section 1983 
provides a federal cause of action against public officials if they “depriv[e] 
[American citizens] of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution.”29  But, 
soon after the Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape,30 gave the green light to 
the plaintiffs to proceed with their civil suit against police officers under 
§ 1983, the Court recognized a serious issue:  the threat of being held 
personally liable for damages might inhibit public officials’ abilities to do 
their jobs effectively.31  To address this concern, the Court adopted the 
qualified immunity doctrine.32  Under the original iteration of the qualified 
immunity doctrine, public officials were immunized from civil suit under 
§ 1983 if they violated one’s constitutional rights in “good faith” and with 
“probable cause.”33  Today, however, the doctrine has evolved into an 
objective framework for evaluating the conduct of public officials. 
Part I.A.1 recounts the adoption and historical background of § 1983 
claims.  Part I.A.2 discusses the adoption and evolution of the qualified 
immunity doctrine.  Part I.A.3 analyzes the various justifications made by the 
Supreme Court in favor of the qualified immunity doctrine and various 
critiques of the doctrine. 
1.  42 U.S.C. § 1983:  Enforcing Equal Protection of the Law via 
Constitutional Torts 
Section 1983 was enacted as part of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act34 in 
“respon[se] to ‘the reign of terror imposed by the Klan upon black citizens’” 
in the South.35  After the Civil War, state governments in the South were not 
holding the Ku Klux Klan or its members criminally or civilly accountable 
for the violence they perpetrated, effectively denying their victims equal 
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
 
 28. See WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE:  
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2020). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 45, 52 (2018). 
 30. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 31. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967). 
 32. See id. at 557. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 35. See Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983)); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171, 174–77. 
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Clause.36  The purpose of § 1983 was to provide a civil remedy against 
official state actors who “were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.”37  
After several decades of § 1983 not being utilized,38 the Supreme Court 
permitted a § 1983 claim to proceed in Monroe, when the Court allowed a 
plaintiff to sue police officers after they entered the plaintiff’s home without 
a warrant.39 
2.  Today’s Qualified Immunity Doctrine:  The “Clearly Established” 
Analysis 
After the Supreme Court accepted § 1983 as providing a cause of action, 
the Supreme Court, in Pierson v. Ray,40 noted its fear that public officials 
might not do their jobs as effectively due to the threat of being held 
personally liable for damages.41  Thus, the Court crafted a solution to this 
problem:  a limited immunity from torts for public officials arising out of 
actions taken in the line of duty.42  The Pierson Court held that a subjective 
defense of “good faith and probable cause” was available to public officials 
who are sued personally for depriving individuals of their constitutional 
rights.43 
About two decades later, the Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,44 
made important modifications to the qualified immunity doctrine.  First, the 
Court formulated a similar rationale as the Pierson Court did for granting 
qualified immunity—namely, that the fear of being sued personally would 
prevent public officials from performing their jobs effectively.45  The Court, 
however, recognized that this risk was exacerbated by the subjective good 
faith test articulated in Pierson,46 since it is incredibly difficult to determine 
good faith without “entail[ing] broad-ranging discovery and the deposing” of 
witnesses.47  These social and practical litigation costs “can be peculiarly 
 
 36. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171, 174–77. 
 37. See id. at 175–76. 
 38. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 400–01 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (quoting 
Katherine A. Macfarlane, Accelerated Civil Rights Settlements in the Shadow of Section 1983, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 639, 661–62). 
 39. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170–71. 
 40. 386 U.S. 547 (1961). 
 41. Id. at 554. 
 42. Id. (explaining that a public official “should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants 
may hound him with litigation . . . .  [S]uch a burden . . . would contribute not to principled 
and fearless decision-making [by the public officials] but to intimidation”). 
 43. Id. at 550, 557. 
 44. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  Harlow was a case about the immunity available to presidential 
aides rather than public officials sued under § 1983. See id. at 808–09.  The Court, however, 
noted that “it would be ‘untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between 
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials.’” Id. at 809 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 
504 (1978)). 
 45. Id. at 814. 
 46. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 550, 557. 
 47. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817. 
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disruptive to effective government.”48  Thus, the Harlow Court changed the 
legal standard for qualified immunity.  The Court crafted an objective 
inquiry:  qualified immunity is available to public officials so long as they 
did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable [public official] would have known” at the time the action was 
taken.49 
Nearly twenty years later, in Saucier v. Katz,50 the Court refined the 
“clearly established law” inquiry by mandating a two-step sequential analysis 
to determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity.51  
First, a court must determine whether the public official’s actions were an 
actual constitutional violation.52  In so doing, a court must “set forth 
principles” of constitutional law.53  If the court does not find a violation of a 
constitutional right, the inquiry ends here and the public official is entitled to 
qualified immunity.54  If, however, a court finds that the public official’s 
actions did violate a constitutional right, the court moves to the second step:  
whether the official’s unconstitutional actions violated “clearly established” 
law.55  Under the second prong, public officials violate “clearly established” 
law when it would “be clear to a reasonable [official] that [their] conduct was 
unlawful in the situation [they] confronted.”56  In practice, the second prong 
requires a court to research whether there is precedent to determine what the 
“clearly established” law was at the time of the incident.57  In other words, 
courts must look to precedent and determine whether the facts in those cases 
sufficiently resemble the facts in the case at bar to have put every public 
official on notice that those actions were unconstitutional at the time they 
occurred.58 
This two-step sequential analysis was later modified in Pearson v. 
Callahan,59 which gave lower courts the discretion to choose the order in 
which to analyze the two Saucier prongs.60  Thus, courts would apply the 
same two questions going forward, but they could now choose the order of 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). 
 50. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 51. See id. at 201. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 207–08. 
 56. Id. at 202. 
 57. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (“We do not require a case 
directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.”). 
 58. See Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 468 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing District of Columbia 
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018)) (“For the law to be clearly established, there must 
be a close congruence of the facts in the precedent and those in the case before us.”). 
 59. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 60. See id. at 236; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 15. 
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the questions or simply skip to the clearly established law prong.61  The Court 
identified several justifications for its rationale.62  Namely, the Court noted 
that Saucier’s mandatory sequential framework is inefficient:  parties and 
judges should not expend resources on briefing and ruling on novel 
constitutional issues when a simpler, dispositive resolution was available by 
deciding the clearly established law prong.63  Additionally, the Court 
highlighted that, because judges usually recognize that the second prong 
easily disposes of cases, they might not analyze important constitutional 
questions scrupulously so they can quickly reach the second prong and 
dispose of a case.64 
3.  The Policy Rationales and Critiques of Qualified Immunity 
In addition to the overdeterrence issue discussed in Harlow, the Supreme 
Court has articulated various justifications and goals for granting qualified 
immunity to public officials.  This section outlines some of the oft-repeated 
rationales behind the qualified immunity doctrine. 
First, qualified immunity is meant to protect public officials from the 
“social costs” arising from “the expenses of litigation.”65  The Harlow Court 
noted that the costs accompanying litigation are not only limited to time and 
money but also include the “distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of . . . people from 
public service.”66  More specifically, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
burdens of discovery and trial on public officials when they are sued.  The 
Court has highlighted that “the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the 
qualified immunity doctrine” was to assure that “‘insubstantial claims’ 
against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.”67  Thus, 
qualified immunity is not just an immunity from liability; it is “an immunity 
from suit” itself.68  Moreover, if qualified immunity is not granted in the early 
stages of a suit and the case is permitted to go to trial, the benefits of qualified 
immunity are lost because the goal of qualified immunity is to avoid 
subjecting public officials to time-consuming and costly discovery.69 
Second, qualified immunity endeavors to provide public officials 
“breathing room” in the discharge of their duties.70  The Supreme Court 
 
 61. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, 
at 15 (noting that “Pearson granted lower courts the discretion to go directly to the second 
step and evaluate the ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified immunity analysis”). 
 62. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–42. 
 63. Id. at 236–37. 
 64. Id. at 239. 
 65. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
 66. Id. at 816. 
 67. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 
(1987)). 
 68. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 69. Id. at 526. 
 70. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (“Qualified immunity gives 
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open 
legal questions.”). 
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understood that public officials do not always have the requisite knowledge 
of whether a particular action is clearly unlawful in the circumstances they 
might face.71  Police officers, in particular, are in a unique position where 
they must make split-second decisions for the public’s and their own safety 
while “traversing difficult contours of constitutional law,” which may not be 
clear until a court applies the law to the facts.72 
Qualified immunity, however, has sustained significant critiques, both 
legal and practical.  Legally, immunity itself is not mentioned anywhere in 
the text of § 1983.73  Additionally, the clearly established law framework is 
nowhere to be found in § 1983 or the Constitution.74 
Practically, qualified immunity shuts the courtroom door on civil rights 
plaintiffs and allows defendant-public officials to “duck consequences for 
bad behavior.”75  As Justice Sotomayor once pointed out, the Supreme 
Court’s current approach risks rendering the qualified immunity doctrine “an 
absolute shield for law enforcement officers.”76  Moreover, one qualified 
immunity scholar, Professor Joanna C. Schwartz, marshals empirical 
evidence that shows qualified immunity fails its basic policy goals.77  First, 
Professor Schwartz argues it is questionable that the threat of being sued 
personally deters police officers from doing their jobs effectively.78  
Professor Schwartz cites studies indicating “that law enforcement officers 
infrequently think about the threat of being sued when performing their jobs” 
and that “a substantial percentage of officers believe lawsuits deter unlawful 
behavior.”79  Moreover, Professor Schwartz argues that “the doctrine is 
utterly miserable at achieving its goal” of preventing public officials from 
enduring discovery.80  Data from approximately 1200 federal district court 
cases over a two-year period found that less than 1 percent of § 1983 claims 
were dismissed before discovery.81 
To summarize, the goals of qualified immunity, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court, are undermined by legal, practical, and empirical critiques.  
The next section analyzes how the law surrounding affirmative defenses 
affects qualified immunity. 
 
 71. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) (“It is sometimes difficult for an officer to 
determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer 
confronts.”); see also Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743. 
 72. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 847 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 73. See Baude, supra note 29, at 50. 
 74. See Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404 (S.D. Miss. 2020). 
 75. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2, 6 (2017) (discussing the expansiveness of the qualified immunity doctrine and its 
impact on civil rights plaintiffs). 
 76. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 77. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). 
 78. Id. at 1811–14. 
 79. Id. at 1811–12. 
 80. Id. at 1809. 
 81. Id. (“[J]ust seven of these 1183 cases (0.6%) were dismissed on qualified immunity 
grounds before discovery.”). 
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B.  An Affirmative Shield:  Affirmative Defenses and How Defendants Can 
Win Outside of the Case’s Merits 
To appreciate the issue of courts raising qualified immunity sua sponte, it 
is important to understand the origins and mechanics of affirmative defenses.  
Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,82 courts risk flouting 
its purpose and basic principles of civil procedure if they raise qualified 
immunity sua sponte.83  Affirmative defenses allow a defendant to admit (or, 
for the sake of the suit, assume) that the plaintiff’s prima facie case elements 
are true, while asserting that there are alternative grounds that allow the 
defendant to escape liability.84 
Qualified immunity is also called an affirmative defense for a reason:  the 
defendant must affirmatively raise the defense or risk waiving it.85  One 
important reason why a defendant must raise these defenses affirmatively is 
fairness.86  If the legal system provides means for the defendant to escape 
liability even after, in theory, admitting to the plaintiff’s factual claims, it is 
only fair that the plaintiff should be “provided with notice at a case’s 
inception as to what affirmative material will be raised against it.”87  These 
rationales developed at common law but have evolved due to the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).  The next section provides an 
overview of affirmative defenses at common law and under FRCP. 
1.  The Common-Law Roots of Affirmative Defenses and FRCP 8(c) 
At common law, a defendant is able to defeat a plaintiff’s prima facie case 
by raising an affirmative defense.88  An affirmative defense is a “defendant’s 
assertion of facts and argument, that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . 
claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.”89  In other words, 
the defendant essentially “confesses” to the plaintiff’s allegations but 
“avoids” liability by pointing to “additional new material” that defeats the 
claim.90  That is why an affirmative defense is sometimes referred to as 
 
 82. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure & Federal Courts as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 4–7, Hamner v. Burls, 141 S. Ct. 611 (2020) (mem.) (No. 19-1291) 
[hereinafter Brief of Professors] (discussing how a court’s raising of an affirmative defense 
sua sponte undermines the adversarial process). 
 84. See Katherine A. Macfarlane, Adversarial No More:  How Sua Sponte Assertion of 
Affirmative Defenses to Habeas Wreaks Havoc on the Rules of Civil Procedure, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 177, 185 (2012). 
 85. See David H. Taylor, Filing with Your Fingers Crossed:  Should a Party Be 
Sanctioned for Filing a Claim to Which There Is a Dispositive, yet Waivable, Affirmative 
Defense?, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1040–42 (1997). 
 86. See Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 188. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See 5 ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (3d ed. 
2020). 
 89. Affirmative Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 90. 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1270. 
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“confession and avoidance” or simply “avoidance.”91  At common law, 
however, a defendant could not both deny the plaintiff’s allegations and raise 
an affirmative defense.92  Thus, when raising an affirmative defense, the 
defendant essentially says “yes, but . . .” to the plaintiff’s allegation.93 
FRCP 8(c) contains a nonexhaustive list of eighteen affirmative defenses, 
which states that a defendant must affirmatively plead “any avoidance or 
affirmative defense.”94  Although FRCP 8(c)’s pedigree is rooted in the 
common law,95 there is one notable departure:  there is no technical 
requirement that the defendant need “confess” to the plaintiff’s allegations.96  
Some courts, however, have retained the common-law requirement that the 
defendant must admit to the allegations to raise an affirmative defense.97  The 
next section analyzes some principles and practices courts use to determine 
when a defendant has waived an affirmative defense. 
2.  Affirmative Defenses Outside of FRCP 8(c) 
As mentioned above, FRCP 8(c)’s list of affirmative defenses is not 
exhaustive.98  FRCP, however, do not provide an instruction manual for how 
to determine which defenses are “affirmative.”99  There are, however, 
principles that courts use to ascertain what is an affirmative defense that is 
not enumerated in FRCP 8(c).100 
One principle is federal precedent, which is the gold standard for 
determining whether a defense is an affirmative defense.101  According to 
Judge Charles E. Clark, former Second Circuit judge and drafter of the 
 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“[A] party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative 
defense.”); see Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 185 (“Affirmative defenses are descendants of 
the common law plea of ‘confession and avoidance.’”). 
 92. See 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1271. 
 93. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 185. 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  The affirmative defenses listed in FRCP 8(c) are as follows:  
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. Id.; 
see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1271 (noting that the list of affirmative defenses in 
FRCP 8(c) “is not intended to be exhaustive”). 
 95. See 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1270 (referring to FRCP 8(c) as “a lineal 
descendant of the common law plea . . . of ‘confession and avoidance’”). 
 96. Id. (explaining that the “imposed election between the [defendant’s] right to deny the 
allegations in the complaint and the right to [raise an affirmative defense] has been eliminated 
by Rule 8(e)”). 
 97. See, e.g., SEC v. Jantzen, No. A-10-CA-740, 2011 WL 250322, at *1–2 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 25, 2011) (holding that affirmative defenses that “are denials of what are elements of a 
prima facie case” are not “proper affirmative defense[s]”); Gwin v. Curry, 161 F.R.D. 70, 71–
72 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[T]he basic notion that an [affirmative defense] should accept rather than 
contradict the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint remains valid.”). 
 98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 99. See 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1271. 
 100. See generally id.  There are other considerations that determine nonenumerated 
affirmative defenses under FRCP 8(c).  These include unfair surprise, the logical inference 
test, fairness, and policy. See id.  These rationales are extraneous for the purposes of this Note 
and are omitted. 
 101. Id. 
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FRCP,102 the single most important factor in determining an affirmative 
defense that is not listed in FRCP 8(c) is whether federal court precedent has 
treated a defense as an avoidance or an affirmative defense.103  As for 
qualified immunity, federal courts have treated it as an affirmative 
defense.104  The next section provides a brief overview of how courts 
determine if and when an affirmative defense is waived. 
3.  The Rules of Waiver:  How Affirmative Defenses Are Waived 
FRCP 8(c) states that “a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or 
affirmative defense.”105  As previously mentioned, defendants must raise an 
affirmative defense, and if they fail to do so, it “results in the waiver of that 
defense and its exclusion from the case.”106  The reason for this requirement 
is fairness.107  In the words of Judge Clark, it is “only fair” that affirmative 
defenses be raised affirmatively because they “seem[] more or less to admit 
the general complaint and yet . . . suggest some other reasons why” there 
should be no recovery for the plaintiff.108  In other words, because defendants 
have the privilege of admitting to plaintiffs’ allegations while avoiding 
liability, they must comply with the “requir[ement] that [affirmative 
defenses] be pled in a particular way.”109 
While the general waiver rule under FRCP 8(c) might sound unequivocal, 
there are “numerous exceptions.”110  Courts generally take a liberal approach 
in determining whether an affirmative defense has been waived under FRCP 
8(c).111  As one court characterized the general approach to waiver rules: 
 
 102. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976). 
 103. 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1271 (“[P]rior decisions of federal courts . . . have 
been relied upon as indicative of what should be considered an ‘avoidance or affirmative 
defense.’”). 
 104. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 
635 (1980)) (“Qualified . . . immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a 
defendant official.”); Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A 
government official faced with a civil rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
entitled to raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.”); Betts v. Shearman, No. 12 
Civ. 3195, 2013 WL 311124, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (“Qualified immunity is an 
affirmative defense.”). 
 105. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 106. 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1278. 
 107. See Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 188–89. 
 108. 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1270 (quoting FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., OCTOBER 6, 7, 8, 1938, AND OF THE 
SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY, OCTOBER 17, 18, 19, 1938, at 49 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 
1938)). 
 109. Macfarlane, supra note 84, at 189. 
 110. 5 MILLER ET AL., supra note 88, § 1278. 
 111. See Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
First Union Nat’l Bank v. Pictet Overseas Tr. Corp., 477 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2007)) 
(explaining that “technical failure to comply with Rule 8(c) is not fatal” as long as raising the 
affirmative defense “does not result in unfair surprise” to the plaintiff); Miller Weisbrod, LLP 
v. Klein Frank PC, No. 13-CV-2695, 2014 WL 3512994, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2014) 
(explaining that waiver will not occur if the defendant raises an affirmative defense at a time 
that will not cause prejudice to the plaintiff). 
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[U]nder Rule 8(c) we do not take a formalistic approach to determine 
whether an affirmative defense was waived.  Rather, we look at the overall 
context of the litigation and have found no waiver where no evidence of 
prejudice exists and sufficient time to respond to the defense remains before 
trial.112 
In addition to prejudice, courts also consider other factors, such as notice and 
unfair surprise.113  These factors are sometimes interrelated and assist the 
court in determining whether the defendant raised an affirmative defense “at 
a ‘pragmatically sufficient time’” to avoid waiver.114 
The purpose of FRCP 8(c)’s requirement of raising defenses affirmatively 
is to provide the plaintiff with notice of the defense and an opportunity to 
prepare a response.115  However, it is possible to achieve notice within the 
boundaries of FRCP 8(c) as long as it is not prejudicial to the plaintiff.116  
Thus, if a plaintiff receives notice of the affirmative defense “by some means 
other than the pleadings,” the defense is not waived as long as the plaintiff 
does not suffer prejudice.117  For example, say a plaintiff notices an 
affirmative defense in a response to a motion for summary judgment.118  The 
general rule is that affirmative defenses should be raised in the pleadings.119  
If, however, the plaintiff is not prejudiced by the defendant’s failure to 
properly raise the defense in the pleadings but is aware of the defense 
incidentally (in this case, in a motion for summary judgment), the defense 
might not be waived.120 
Prejudice and unfair surprise to the plaintiff are also critical factors in 
determining whether waiver has occurred.121  Prejudice can occur if raising 
a defense outside of the pleadings would require plaintiffs “to expend 
significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; 
significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or prevent the plaintiff from 
bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.”122  Additionally, long 
periods of time between the pleadings and the defendant raising a new 
 
 112. Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 113. See Rogers v. IRS, 822 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that an affirmative 
defense can be raised outside of the pleadings as long as it does not result in surprise or 
prejudice to the plaintiff); Shelbyville Hosp. Corp. v. Mosley, No. 13-CV-88, 2017 WL 
5586729, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017) (listing notice and substantial prejudice as key 
factors for determining waiver). 
 114. Shelbyville Hosp. Corp., 2017 WL 5586729, at *14 (quoting Moore, Owen, Thomas 
& Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *15. 
 117. Id. (quoting Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir. 
1993)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Burton v. Ghosh, 961 F.3d 960, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 120. Id. at 965. 
 121. See id. (noting prejudice as a factor for determining waiver); Rogers v. IRS, 822 F.3d 
854, 856 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting prejudice and unfair surprise as factors for determining 
waiver). 
 122. Rogers, 822 F.3d at 857 (quoting Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 
1994)). 
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affirmative defense does not necessarily constitute waiver.123  Similar factors 
are also considered when determining whether a plaintiff was unfairly 
surprised, including whether the plaintiff had notice of the defense, whether 
the plaintiff should have expected the defense to be raised, and whether the 
plaintiff was “afforded ample opportunity to respond.”124  Finally, there are 
also procedural safeguards in the FRCP:  FRCP 15 permits parties to liberally 
amend their pleadings should they seek to add affirmative defenses later in 
the litigation.125 
In sum, the law provides defendants with several backstops if they neglect 
to raise an affirmative defense or if they raise an affirmative defense 
incorrectly.  These procedural safeguards allow defendants to properly abide 
by the “central tenets of the [American] adversarial model:  that courts act as 
passive and neutral decisionmakers, reviewing only the legal and factual 
disputes presented for adjudication by the parties.”126 
C.  Super Courts:  Appellate Courts Raising Issues Sua Sponte 
In light of the purposes of affirmative defenses and the considerable 
leeway trial courts allow defendants to preserve affirmative defenses, 
appellate courts raising affirmative defenses sua sponte create tension with 
the tenets of the adversarial system of party representation.127  Indeed, the 
general rule that an appellate court will only consider issues presented by the 
parties before them “is as old as the common-law system of appellate review” 
itself.128  This general rule, however, is subject to some exceptions and 
appellate courts can usually raise issues sua sponte if they desire.129  This 
section looks to the origins of this general rule, its exceptions, and its 
rationales. 
1.  Singleton v. Wulff:  The Origins of the General Rule 
In Singleton v. Wulff,130 the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is the general 
rule . . . that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed 
upon below.”131  The rule stems from the English legal system.132  
Originally, a jury or judge who rendered a false verdict or false judicial 
decision was tried on appeal and potentially subject to imprisonment for that 
 
 123. See Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
the trial court for holding that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity was waived solely 
on the basis that fifty-two months had passed between the pleadings and the raising of the 
defense). 
 124. See Rogers, 822 F.3d at 857. 
 125. HOWARD M. ERICHSON & J. MARIA GLOVER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 82–84 (2021); see also 
Burton, 961 F.3d at 965–66. 
 126. Brief of Professors, supra note 83, at 3. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal:  The General Rule and the 
Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1987). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
 131. Id. at 120. 
 132. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1026. 
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mistaken decision.133  This appeals process was done in equity proceedings 
in the House of Lords, the principal appellate court in England.134  The House 
of Lords “had the power to review any issue of law or fact regardless of 
whether it was in the record.”135  This system eventually evolved into the 
writ of error, which is now the basis of American court procedures for 
appealing a judgment rendered below.136 
As its name suggests, the writ of error is “predicated on the concept that 
its purpose was to determine whether the trial judge had erred.”137  Thus, the 
writ of error logically limited appellate courts to reviewing matters actually 
decided by the trial court to determine whether an error had occurred.138  
Thus, unlike the House of Lords, which could raise any issue it desired to 
“render . . . judgment it thought justice demanded,”139 common-law writ of 
error appellate courts could not “raise new issues sua sponte” and were 
confined to ruling on questions “reflected in the record.”140  In sum, appellate 
courts in the common-law writ of error system could only review matters of 
law since “[t]he purpose [of an appeal in the writ of error system] was not to 
test whether the proper party had won, but only whether the judge had made 
an error.”141 
As mentioned above, the American appellate court system is based on the 
writ of error approach.142  This approach is consistent with the adversarial 
model of party representation, in which the parties are responsible for 
proffering legal arguments and are generally required to preserve legal 
arguments or defenses for appeal.143  The American legal system “is 
designed around the premise that [parties represented by competent counsel] 
know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and 
argument entitling them to relief.”144 
2.  Exceptions to the General Rule 
The general rule that appellate courts will not decide issues raised for the 
first time on appeal is subject to exceptions.145  The Singleton Court, while 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. Ronald J. Offenkrantz & Aaron S. Lichter, Sua Sponte Actions in the Appellate 
Courts:  The “Gorilla Rule” Revisited, 17 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 113, 117 (2016). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1026. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 1026–27. 
 139. Offenkranz & Lichter, supra note 134, at 117 (quoting Martineau, supra note 128, at 
1027). 
 140. Id. (quoting Martineau, supra note 128, at 1026–28). 
 141. Martineau, supra note 128, at 1026–27 (emphasis added). 
 142. Offenkranz & Lichter, supra note 134, at 118. 
 143. See Brief of Professors, supra note 83; see also Martineau, supra note 128, at 1030 
(noting that litigants have “an obligation to assert [their] rights at the first opportunity”). 
 144. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 145. See Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 67 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing the affirmative 
defense of qualified immunity sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that it was raised for the 
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announcing the general rule, also stated that they “announce no general rule” 
and that “[t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the 
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion” of appellate 
courts.146  So while appellate courts generally do not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal, the Singleton Court left the door open for courts 
to raise issues sua sponte.147 
The first exception to the general rule, which is “universally recognized,” 
is subject matter jurisdiction.148  Subject matter jurisdiction, which is 
essentially whether a federal court has the power to hear a certain case,149 
can be raised by the court or any party at any stage of litigation.150  If the 
court—trial or appellate—realizes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it 
must dismiss the case.151  While it would seem like a flagrant violation of the 
general rule if subject matter jurisdiction is raised for the first time on appeal, 
subject matter jurisdiction is a mandatory prerequisite for a federal court to 
hear any case ab initio.152  As Professor Robert Martineau has explained, “the 
general rule presupposes subject matter jurisdiction,” so it is not really a per 
se exception to the rule.153  Moreover, any case heard where a court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction exceeds the “elemental power of the courts,” since 
the legislature, not the litigants or courts, confer the jurisdictional power to 
hear a case.154 
There are multiple nonjurisdictional exceptions to the general rule, which 
appellate courts have relied on when deciding an issue for the first time on 
appeal.155  The issue, however, is that courts may not explicitly state when 
they raise an issue sua sponte, and if they do, their analysis as to why they 
are raising the issue might be cursory.156 
 
first time on appeal); Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 845–46, 845 n.23 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (same). 
 146. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). 
 147. The Singleton Court did not prescribe specific criteria for when an appellate court can 
raise an issue for the first time on appeal.  The Court did, however, outline some considerations 
courts could take into account, such as if “proper resolution is beyond any doubt” or “where 
‘injustice might otherwise result.’” Id. (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 
(1941)). 
 148. Martineau, supra note 128, at 1045. 
 149. See ERICHSON & GLOVER, supra note 125, at 443. 
 150. Martineau, supra note 128, at 1045–46. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1046–47. 
 153. Id. at 1047. 
 154. See Vestal, supra note 12, at 502; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (listing defenses 
that a party can waive, including personal jurisdiction, but excluding subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 155. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1034–56 (noting that some exceptions to the general 
rule include sovereign immunity, fundamental error, and issues certain to arise in other cases); 
Vestal, supra note 12, at 499–508 (noting exceptions such as contra bonas mores and 
interpretation of instruments).  For the purposes of this Note, only pertinent exceptions that 
plausibly arise in the qualified immunity context are analyzed. 
 156. See Vestal, supra note 12, at 497 (“Unless there is a dissenting opinion noting the fact, 
only the attorneys for the litigants will be aware that the court has decided the case on issues 
not argued to the court.”).  This point is well illustrated by Story v. Foote, where the Eighth 
Circuit raised qualified immunity sua sponte. 782 F.3d 968, 969–70 (8th Cir. 2015).  The court 
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One exception is that courts might raise new issues sua sponte only to 
affirm the trial court.157  The reason is that merely affirming a lower court 
based on different reasoning would not waste judicial resources because no 
further proceedings would be necessary and the lower court arrived at the 
correct judgment anyway.158  Another court has laid out four notable 
exceptions to the general rule for when a court can raise issues sua sponte for 
the first time on appeal.159  The First Circuit, in United States v. Krynicki,160 
heard an appeal where the government raised an argument that was not raised 
below in the trial court.161  The court acknowledged the general rule but also 
acknowledged Singleton, which allows courts to consider issues for the first 
time on appeal in “exceptional cases or particular circumstances.”162  The 
court outlined four reasons for its departure from the general rule.163 
First, the court held that “purely legal” issues that do not require additional 
fact-finding can be decided for the first time on appeal.164  The court noted 
that an essential reason for the general rule is to permit the parties to develop 
the factual record extensively in light of the issues raised below.165  When 
purely legal issues are presented on appeal, however, this rationale is 
absent.166  Second, the court noted that the resolution of the case based on 
the new issue was “highly persuasive” and “le[ft] no doubt as to the proper 
resolution of th[e] issue.”167  The court reasoned that the government’s 
argument in Krynicki was so persuasive that it justified raising the issue for 
the first time on appeal.168  Third, the court noted that the issue was “almost 
certain to arise in other cases.”169  The logic is that simple, purely legal issues 
should be decided, even if raised for the first time on appeal, to preserve 
limited judicial resources.170  Finally, the last factor is whether declining to 
decide the issue at bar would “result in a miscarriage of justice.”171 
 
justified its sua sponte action simply by citing a screening statute and stating that the court can 
rule on “any ground supported by the record” even though the lower court dismissed the suit 
without discussing qualified immunity. Id. at 970.  Judge Kermit E. Bye dissented, pointing 
out that he was “unable to find[] any cases where the Eighth Circuit sua sponte raised the 
affirmative defense of qualified immunity after the district court dismissed [the case] without 
mention of qualified immunity.” Id. at 975 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. See Vestal, supra note 12, at 491–92. 
 158. See id. 
 159. United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291–92 (1st Cir. 1982); see also Martineau, 
supra note 128, at 1035–37 (analyzing Krynicki). 
 160. 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 161. Id. at 291. 
 162. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d 850, 853 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
 163. Id. at 291–92. 
 164. Id. at 291. 
 165. See id.; see also Martineau, supra note 128, at 1038–40. 
 166. See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. 
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3.  Rationale for the General Rule and Critiques of Its Exceptions 
The general rule is fundamental to our appellate court system.  First, 
because the appeals process is rooted in the writ of error model, in which 
appellate courts only review errors made by the trial court, it is naturally 
incongruous for an appellate court to decide a case on an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal.172  In other words, if appellate courts review issues that 
were not decided by a trial court, then the appellate courts are not rectifying 
any errors.173  This flouts the fundamental purpose of appellate courts in our 
system of adjudication.174 
Second, appellate courts raising issues sua sponte contradicts the 
adversarial nature of party representation, which is a hallmark of American 
law.175  Appellate courts are meant to be “passive instrumentalities” and the 
“initiative is never theirs” when it comes to raising arguments for the 
parties.176 
Third, appellate courts raising issues sua sponte can waste judicial 
resources and prevent uniformity in the law.177  Appellate courts that raise 
new issues sua sponte may have to do their own research into the legal issues 
that usually are completed by the litigants, which wastes judicial 
resources.178  Moreover, appellate courts tend to depart from the general rule 
inconsistently,179 which creates uncertainty as to when an appellate court will 
raise or permit new issues on appeal.180  This might encourage litigants to 
engage in gamesmanship by raising certain issues below, hoping to prevail 
on those grounds; if they fail, they might then raise new or waived issues on 
appeal hoping for the appellate court to entertain those arguments sua 
 
 172. Offenkrantz & Lichter, supra note 134, at 118; Vestal, supra note 12, at 490–91. 
 173. Vestal, supra note 12, at 491 (“Since the lower court has not been given an opportunity 
to consider the matter and rectify it, the lower court has not erred, and it follows that the 
appellate court cannot act.”). 
 174. See Offenkrantz & Lichter, supra note 134, at 117–18. 
 175. Brief of Professors, supra note 83, at 4 (“It is well-established that in our adversarial 
system, ‘[courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right’ and 
instead ‘normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020))). 
 176. Vestal, supra note 12, at 487; see also Offenkrantz & Lichter, supra note 134, at 117 
(noting that the writ of error model “ultimately reflected the idea of the ‘adversary process,’ 
under which the litigants rather than the court controlled the issues in the case”). 
 177. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1024 (asserting that raising issues sua sponte 
without any principled justification can make it harder for litigants to predict when and why 
an appellate court will take such an action); Vestal, supra note 12, at 495 (arguing that raising 
new issues sua sponte causes appellate courts to “do all of the work, analytical and research, 
with absolutely no assistance from the parties”). 
 178. Vestal, supra note 12, at 495. 
 179. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1057 (noting that “[i]nconsistency is the hallmark 
of the various exceptions” to the general rule). 
 180. Id. at 1024 (noting that inconsistent reasoning from appellate courts as to when they 
raise issues sua sponte creates uncertainty and encourages more appeals, which “adds to the 
already overwhelming caseload of American appellate courts”). 
2712 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
sponte.181  In sum, this uncertainty might incentivize more appeals, which 
increases the workload on appellate courts.182 
Fourth, raising issues sua sponte on appeal can stunt the development of a 
full and robust record for the appellate court to review.183  The Singleton 
Court noted that the general rule is critical for the ability of litigants to gather 
relevant, salient evidence for the issues they proffer at trial.184  Thus, 
considering issues for the first time on appeal can prevent the aggrieved party 
from gathering evidence or preparing arguments in a timely manner.185 
Finally, raising an issue sua sponte can cause surprise.186  The “purely 
legal” questions exception to the general rule highlights the issue of 
surprise.187  Because cases tend to last for many months or years, litigants 
have ample time to develop the record and their legal arguments.188  Raising 
an issue sua sponte, however, might force a party to prepare a legal argument 
on an incomplete record and over a much shorter time frame.189  Moreover, 
the assumption in the “purely legal” questions exception—that there is no 
need for additional fact-finding—is questionable considering that “[n]o case 
is tried so completely and competently that an appellate court can confidently 
say that the trial would have gone exactly the same way if a new, 
determinative, legal issue had been raised in the trial court.”190 
To summarize, although it may be common for appellate courts to raise 
issues sua sponte,191 doing so is not entirely consistent with the writ of error 
 
 181. See, e.g., Guzmán-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F.3d 664, 669 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a qualified immunity defense was waived at the pretrial stage because the defendant 
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party the liberty to raise an unrelated argument at trial, and if the state party loses, it can raise 
the Eleventh Amendment defense on appeal). 
 182. See Martineau, supra note 128, at 1024. 
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 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1037. 
 191. One famous instance of the Supreme Court raising an issue sua sponte is Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Timothy Macht & Derek Borchardt, Can Courts 
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https://www.law.com/ 
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model, which presupposes reviewing an error made by the trial court.192  
Additionally, appellate courts raising issues sua sponte can cause significant 
practical problems, including unfairness to litigants193 and the inefficient use 
of judicial resources.194 
II.  AFFIRMATIVE OR SPONTANEOUS IMMUNITY?:  THE INCONSISTENCY 
AMONG APPELLATE COURTS 
As noted above, if a defendant does not raise an affirmative defense in a 
timely manner, it may be subject to waiver.195  Generally, an appellate court 
will only consider arguments raised in the trial court.196  Appellate court 
judges do, however, have the discretion to consider waived arguments or 
consider new legal issues sua sponte.197  Some appellate courts have raised 
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity sua sponte even though the 
lower court did not address the issue.  Others, however, emphasize that it is 
an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant in the lower court, 
or it is waived. 
Part II analyzes the inconsistency of federal circuit courts as to whether a 
defendant waives qualified immunity if they fail to raise it properly in the 
trial court or whether judges can raise it sua sponte on appeal.  Specifically, 
Part II.A examines circuit court decisions raising qualified immunity sua 
sponte on appeal.  Part II.B analyzes circuit court decisions asserting that 
qualified immunity must be raised by the defendant at the trial court. 
A.  Spontaneous Immunity 
Because of the broad discretion Singleton confers to appellate courts to 
consider new issues on appeal,198 some circuit courts have raised the 
qualified immunity affirmative defense sua sponte.199  This section outlines 
select cases from the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits that have raised 
qualified immunity sua sponte.  Although the cases have different procedural 
postures, the result is the same in each:  the appellate court raised qualified 
immunity sua sponte when it otherwise would have been waived. 
1.  Dean v. Blumenthal 
In Dean v. Blumenthal,200 the Second Circuit relied on the “purely legal” 




 192. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text. 
 195. Taylor, supra note 85, at 1042; see also supra Part I.B. 
 196. See generally Vestal, supra note 12. 
 197. See supra Part 1.C. 
 198. See supra Part I.C. 
 199. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 12–13. 
 200. 577 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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sponte.201  In 2002, then Connecticut Attorney General (and now Senator) 
Richard Blumenthal was sued by Martha Dean, then a candidate running 
against Blumenthal in the Connecticut attorney general race.202  As attorney 
general, Blumenthal instituted a policy that prohibited attorney general 
candidates from receiving campaign contributions from any outside counsel 
that had worked with the Connecticut Office of the Attorney General.203  
Dean sued under § 1983 for:  (1) a violation of the First Amendment right to 
receive campaign contributions and (2) the deprivation of due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to receive campaign contributions from 
willing donors.204 
The Second Circuit raised qualified immunity sua sponte during oral 
argument.205  The court, in a footnote, acknowledged that the general rule is 
“that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal.”206  The court, however, cited two reasons for departing from the 
general rule.207  First, it cited the “purely legal” issue exception to the general 
rule, in which appellate courts can raise issues sua sponte if the issues do not 
require additional fact-finding.208  Because the clearly established law 
analysis from Saucier’s second prong fits into this category, the court found 
it appropriate to raise qualified immunity sua sponte.209  Second, the court 
stated that the general rule “is prudential, not jurisdictional” and that it “ha[d] 
[the] discretion to consider waived arguments” on appeal.210  The Second 
Circuit then granted Blumenthal qualified immunity, stating that there was 
“no clearly established” right to receive campaign contributions at the time 
Blumenthal enforced the policy.211 
2.  Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene 
Like the Second Circuit in Dean, the Ninth Circuit in Graves v. City of 
Coeur D’Alene212 raised qualified immunity sua sponte, relying on the 
“purely legal” issue exception to the general rule.213  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, articulated an additional rationale for departing from the general 
rule:  it held that it could rule on any issue supported by the record.214  In 
Graves, one of the defendant-police officers arrested one of the plaintiffs, 
 
 201. Id. at 67 n.6. 
 202. Id. at 63. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 67 n.6. 
 206. Id. (quoting Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. (quoting Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 378 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam)). 
 211. Id. at 68–70. 
 212. 339 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 213. Id. at 845–46 n.23. 
 214. Id. 
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who was a counterprotester at a neo-Nazi rally.215  The officer justified the 
arrest for a number of reasons:  (1) the plaintiff refused to allow the officer 
to search his knapsack, which appeared full with cylindrical objects and other 
bulky items that the officer suspected was a bomb; (2) there was a “hostile 
atmosphere” among the protestors and counterprotestors, which included 
earlier threats of violence, and police had previously received reports of 
missing explosives from a nearby construction site, which they feared would 
be used at the protest; and (3) the plaintiff refused to provide identification 
and grew increasingly agitated when asked to do so by police.216  The 
plaintiff sued the officers under § 1983 for arresting him without probable 
cause.217 
After trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant-police officer, 
finding that there was probable cause to conduct the arrest.218  The plaintiffs 
filed posttrial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a 
new trial.219  The trial court denied those motions.220 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit that, in a lengthy constitutional 
analysis, concluded that the officer lacked probable cause to conduct the 
arrest.221  In short, the court noted that there was insufficient individualized 
suspicion to support an arrest, despite the hostile atmosphere and the 
plaintiff’s bulky knapsack.222  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the arrest was 
a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.223 
Were that the end of the court’s analysis, the plaintiff likely would have 
recovered damages from the defendant-police officer under § 1983.  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, raised qualified immunity sua sponte and cited two 
reasons for doing so.224  First, the court relied on the “purely legal” issue 
exception to the general rule and noted that the qualified immunity analysis 
in this case involved “an issue of law and . . . [the factual] record ha[d] been 
fully developed.”225  Second, the court noted that the defendant-police 
officers raised qualified immunity in their answer to the plaintiff’s 
complaint.226  Because the court can “affirm the decision of the district court 
on any ground supported by the record,” it raised qualified immunity sua 
sponte.227 
The court then applied the qualified immunity analysis.228  Because the 
court already found that the defendant-police officer violated the plaintiff’s 
 
 215. Id. at 834, 837. 
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constitutional rights by conducting an arrest without probable cause, the 
court proceeded directly to the clearly established prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis.229  The court found that while the underlying arrest was 
a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, that violation was not 
clearly established law at the time of the arrest.230  Thus, the court held that 
the defendant-police officers were entitled to qualified immunity.231 
3.  Hamner v. Burls 
Like the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit, in Hamner v. 
Burls,232 raised qualified immunity sua sponte by relying on the “purely 
legal” issue exception.233  Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit justified 
its decision by stating that it could rely on any legal issue in the record.234  
The Eight Circuit also introduced a new rationale:  efficiency.235  In 2015, 
Hamner, an inmate, alerted prison guards to a potential attack against a prison 
guard.236  The guards, however, moved Hamner to administrative 
segregation because of “security concerns.”237  In administrative segregation, 
Hamner was confined to a prison cell for twenty-three hours per day, served 
cold food, was unable to read due to lack of lighting, and was denied almost 
any human contact.238  Moreover, Hamner’s requests for his prescription 
medications were ignored by the guards.239 
Hamner filed a § 1983 suit against the prison guards, initially alleging a 
violation of his due process rights and a retaliation claim.240  In the 
defendants’ answer to the complaint, defendants raised qualified immunity 
as an affirmative defense.241  Hamner then amended his complaint to add an 
Eighth Amendment claim and expand on his due process claim.242  The 
defendant-prison guards moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure 
to state a claim but did not raise qualified immunity in their motion to 
dismiss.243  The district court granted the motion.244  On appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit raised qualified immunity sua sponte and requested supplemental 
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 230. Id. at 846–47. 
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 236. Id. at 1174. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1175. 
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briefing on the issue.245  Hamner asserted that, because the defendants merely 
stated qualified immunity in their answer and did not raise it in their motion 
to dismiss, they waived the defense at this stage of the litigation.246  The 
Eighth Circuit rejected that argument.247 
The Eighth Circuit justified its decision to raise qualified immunity sua 
sponte by noting that it could “resolve the appeal . . . where the defense was 
established on the face of the complaint.”248  The court acknowledged that 
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity was not raised in the motion to 
dismiss.249  The court, however, reasoned that the procedural posture had 
changed so significantly that it was appropriate to consider qualified 
immunity for the remaining constitutional claims because “qualified 
immunity could be dispositive as to the only claims left on appeal.”250 
The Eighth Circuit also articulated two additional reasons as to why the 
defense could be raised sua sponte.251  The first was efficiency:  the 
defendants stipulated that they would raise qualified immunity on remand if, 
on appeal, the court reversed the district court on any claims.252  And then, 
because the defendants would likely appeal again to the Eighth Circuit to 
review the qualified immunity question, the court reasoned that there is 
“nothing to be profited by that procedural roundabout.”253  Second, the court 
reasoned that the qualified immunity question is a “purely legal” question 
“amenable to consideration for the first time on appeal.”254 
The court also articulated three other reasons why it departed from the 
general rule and raised qualified immunity sua sponte.  First, like the Second 
and Ninth Circuits, the court reasoned that the qualified immunity question 
was “purely legal” and that no additional fact-finding was necessary.255  
Second, the court stated that it could affirm on qualified immunity grounds 
since “the defense was established on the face of the complaint.”256  This 
appears similar to the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Graves, in which the court 
affirmed the trial court based on the issues in the record.257  Third, the court 
stated that because it had requested supplemental briefing on the qualified 
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immunity issue, the parties had “notice and an opportunity to be heard” on 
the qualified immunity issue even though the court had raised it sua 
sponte.258 
B.  Affirmative Immunity 
As the cases above note, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
previously allowed qualified immunity defenses to be raised sua sponte.  In 
contrast, appellate courts from every other circuit have strictly applied the 
general rule.259  That is, where the qualified immunity defense was not 
appropriately raised, it was waived as to that stage of litigation.  This section 
samples cases from these other circuit courts that do not allow qualified 
immunity to be raised for the first time on appeal. 
1.  Guzmán-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz 
In Guzmán-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz260, the First Circuit rejected the 
government’s invitation to raise qualified immunity sua sponte and outlined 
the various stages of litigation in which a defendant can raise that affirmative 
defense.261  The plaintiff in Guzmán-Rivera was convicted of murder in 
1989.262  The plaintiff’s father conducted an independent investigation and 
was able to vindicate his son’s innocence.263  The plaintiff sued employees 
of the U.S. Department of Justice under § 1983 for failing to reinvestigate the 
facts of his case and for failing to move for his release after establishing his 
innocence.264 
The First Circuit outlined when a defendant can appropriately raise the 
affirmative defense of qualified immunity at the various stages of litigation 
before the defense is waived.265  It held that the first stage is on the 
pleadings.266  Instead of filing an answer to a complaint, the defendant can 
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move to dismiss under a qualified immunity theory, and if the motion is 
granted, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity before discovery 
begins.267  The second stage is summary judgment, which occurs 
postdiscovery but pretrial.268  If the defendant moves for summary judgment 
on the basis of qualified immunity and the discovery evidence does not raise 
a genuine dispute of a material fact(s), the suit can be dismissed before 
trial.269  The third stage is at trial.270  Thus, for example, if a defendant raises 
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity improperly in a preanswer 
motion to dismiss (the pleadings stage), it will be waived for the pleadings 
stage and can only be raised in a later stage of the litigation.271 
The court was mindful of the fact that not placing a strict waiver rule on 
qualified immunity can incentivize abuse by a defendant.272  Because 
qualified immunity is an exception to the final judgment rule, a defendant 
can appeal a denial of qualified immunity immediately.273  For example, a 
defendant can raise a nonimmunity theory in a preanswer motion to dismiss, 
and if that fails, the defendant can raise another preanswer motion to dismiss 
on qualified immunity grounds.274  If that fails, the defendant can 
immediately appeal that decision.275  This allows a defendant to initiate 
several time-consuming appeals, which can unduly prejudice plaintiffs by 
causing them to accumulate significant legal fees and can lead to potential 
witnesses’ memories fading.276  This can also substantially burden the courts, 
which would need to wade through these dilatory motions to dismiss, 
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, and remands of those 
interlocutory appeals.277  Thus, the First Circuit held that failure to raise the 
qualified immunity defense appropriately can lead to waiver at the various 
stages of litigation.278 
In Guzmán-Rivera, the defendant waived the qualified immunity defense 
at the summary judgment phase of litigation.279  The defendant raised two 
nonqualified immunity defenses in a motion for summary judgment.280  The 
first motion for summary judgment, based on a statute of limitations theory, 
was denied.281  Later, on the eve of trial, the defendants again moved for 
summary judgment, this time based on an absolute immunity theory.282  After 
that motion was denied, the defendant amended the answer to include 
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qualified immunity and, eight months later, moved for summary judgment 
on that basis.283 
The First Circuit held that “the piecemeal fashion in which defendants 
have brought forward their defense [was] unduly time consuming for the 
courts and potentially prejudicial to the plaintiff.”284  Thus, the defendant 
waived the qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment phase based 
on the failure to raise the defense in a timely fashion.285 
2.  Suarez Corp. v. McGraw 
Suarez Corp. v. McGraw286 also demonstrates strict adherence to the 
general rule in the qualified immunity context.  Suarez, unlike Guzmán-
Rivera, did not deal with qualified immunity being raised in a dilatory 
manner.  Rather, the defendant merely raised the defense for the first time on 
appeal, hoping that the appellate court would consider it.287  The Fourth 
Circuit, however, rejected the defendant’s invitation and held steadfast to the 
general rule that affirmative defenses not properly raised are waived.288  In 
Suarez, the West Virginia attorney general sued several companies, including 
Suarez Corporation, under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and 
Protection Act.289  Suarez Corporation then published an advertisement in a 
local newspaper, criticizing the state attorney general for the decision to bring 
suit.290  In response, the attorney general’s office announced it would move 
forward with the suit against Suarez Corporation alone.291  Suarez 
Corporation sued the attorney general under § 1983, citing retaliation against 
its First Amendment rights and a violation of equal protection.292 
As with many of these cases, the procedural posture in Suarez is 
complicated yet crucial.  The attorney general moved to dismiss Suarez 
Corporation’s claims for failure to state a claim, asserting only an absolute 
immunity defense.293  The trial court denied this motion and the attorney 
general appealed to the Fourth Circuit.294  On appeal, the attorney general 
urged dismissal of the complaint based not only on an absolute immunity 
theory but also on a qualified immunity theory, which was raised for the first 
time on appeal.295  The Fourth Circuit rejected this invitation, holding that 
the defense was waived at the summary judgment stage of the litigation 
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because it was first being raised on appeal.296  Because the “notice of appeal 
to [the Fourth Circuit] only specifically refer[red] to the defense of absolute 
immunity,” and the court had “refused to consider sua sponte a defense of 
qualified immunity . . . when it was not properly preserved below,” the court 
did not consider the qualified immunity question.297 
3.  Bines v. Kulaylat 
In Bines v. Kulaylat,298 the Third Circuit, likewise, rejected an invitation 
to raise qualified immunity sua sponte for the first time on appeal.299  The 
court’s reasoning, however, differed from the reasoning of Guzmán-Rivera 
and Suarez.  Notably, the court explicitly cited Singleton’s general rule and 
provided reasoning why it did not depart from the general rule and raise 
qualified immunity sua sponte.300  In Bines, the plaintiff, a prison inmate, 
suffered from painful swelling of his lymph nodes.301  The defendant-prison 
doctor refused the plaintiff’s request to have his lymph nodes excised and 
instead prescribed medication to alleviate the pain after two months of 
refusing to provide the plaintiff with pain medication.302  The plaintiff sued 
under § 1983, asserting that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference 
to his medical needs” in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment.303 
In his pleadings, the defendant invoked twenty-three affirmative defenses, 
including qualified immunity.304  The defendant, however, did not raise a 
qualified immunity defense in his summary judgment motion.305  After the 
trial court denied the motion, the defendant took an interlocutory appeal to 
the Third Circuit based on the trial court’s denial of his nonqualified 
immunity-based summary judgment motion.306 
On appeal, the defendant raised qualified immunity for the first time.307  
The court refused to consider the qualified immunity defense because it was 
not raised in his summary judgment motion.308  The court cited the general 
rule from Singleton that appellate courts “will not review an issue on appeal 
that has not been raised below.”309  Notably, the court explained why some 
potential exceptions to the general rule did not apply.310  First, the court 
rejected any sort of “injustice” that might occur to the defendant if the 
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qualified immunity defense cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.311  
Because the defendant can raise qualified immunity at the trial court and take 
an interlocutory appeal if the motion is denied, there is no risk of “manifest 
injustice.”312  Second, the court noted that the qualified immunity inquiry 
would not be a “purely legal” issue because the questions surrounding the 
qualified immunity inquiry related to the defendant’s subjective mindset, 
which is a factual question that needs to be developed at the trial court.313 
III.  AFFIRMATIVE IMMUNITY:  WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT CAN 
CONSIDER QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SUA SPONTE 
Part II examined cases in which appellate courts used their broad discretion 
to raise issues sua sponte and others in which courts strictly held to the 
general rule that issues should not be raised for the first time on appeal.  
Raising the affirmative defense of qualified immunity sua sponte, as Part II.A 
demonstrated, can be particularly troublesome.  First, qualified immunity is 
already a difficult affirmative defense for civil rights plaintiffs to 
overcome.314  Allowing appellate courts to consider qualified immunity for 
the first time on appeal, when the defense would have otherwise been waived, 
can effectively lock civil rights plaintiffs out of the courtroom.315  Even 
worse, a case in which a plaintiff would have received a favorable judgment 
but for the court’s raising qualified immunity sua sponte on appeal highlights 
“the most obvious prejudice to the [plaintiff]:  the taking away of a judgment 
in the [plaintiff]’s favor.”316  At the same time, as Part I has made clear, 
courts generally take a liberal approach in determining waiver of affirmative 
defenses.317  Moreover, there is precedent for appellate courts raising issues 
sua sponte, since Singleton provides broad discretion to appellate courts to 
consider new issues for the first time on appeal.318  This Note, mindful of the 
importance of adhering to the general rule that issues should not be raised 
sua sponte—but aware that it does occur—aims to resolve this inconsistency.  
This Note proposes two rules to rectify the current inconsistency among 
appellate courts surrounding whether qualified immunity can be raised sua 
sponte on appeal and, if so, when.  Part III.A outlines the two proposed rules.  
Part III.B argues that courts raising qualified immunity sua sponte contravene 
public policy.  Part III.C advocates for a potential legislative solution in the 
alternative. 
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2021] AFFIRMATIVE IMMUNITY 2723 
A.  The Sunk Costs Test:  A Two-Part Litigation-Based Framework 
The First Circuit, in Guzmán-Rivera, outlined the various stages during 
litigation when a defendant can raise the affirmative defense of qualified 
immunity.319  The Guzmán-Rivera court recognized that there are a number 
of opportunities for a defendant to raise qualified immunity at various stages 
of the litigation without waiving it.320 
These stages of litigation are useful for courts to determine exactly when 
a defendant waived qualified immunity.321  This “stages of litigation” 
analysis, however, ignores the fundamental purpose of the qualified 
immunity doctrine:  to prevent public officials from enduring the burden of 
time-consuming and costly discovery.322  The Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. 
Forsyth,323 recognized that if a suit against a public official is not dismissed 
on qualified immunity grounds before the case goes to the discovery or trial 
stage, the benefits of the qualified immunity doctrine are lost, since the public 
official would have to endure discovery and the trial itself.324  Because a 
central purpose of qualified immunity is to avoid such an outcome and to 
provide defendant-public officials with “immunity from suit” and not just 
immunity from liability,325 appellate courts must keep these foundational 
principles in mind when determining whether qualified immunity was 
waived.  Thus, this Note proposes a two-part legal framework for analyzing 
whether the defendant waived qualified immunity, consistent with the core 
principles of the qualified immunity doctrine. 
1.  The Sunk Costs Test:  Part One 
The first part of the rule is simple:  appellate judges, acting on their own 
without any of the parties raising the issue, may never raise qualified 
immunity sua sponte.  This bright-line rule is consistent with the nature of 
affirmative defenses and the role of appellate courts.  Affirmative defenses 
are rooted in the common-law theory of confession and avoidance, where a 
defendant admits to the allegations of the plaintiff’s prima facie case but 
avoids liability on other grounds.326  Thus, a judge raising an affirmative 
defense sua sponte logically forces the defendant-public official to confess 
to the allegations of the plaintiff and avoid liability on other grounds.327  In 
the qualified immunity context, this is a serious action:  the judge forces a 
public official, someone who the public entrusts with power,328 to admit that 
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the official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.329  This contravenes 
the adversarial theory of party representation because a defendant may very 
well strategically avoid raising certain arguments.330  If defendants wish to 
maintain that they did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights—a grave 
allegation indeed—courts raising an affirmative defense on their behalf sua 
sponte give them no choice but to implicitly confess to doing so.331 
2.  The Sunk Costs Test:  Part Two 
The second part of the proposed test is a two-step sequential analysis.  This 
part assumes that the defendant, rather than the appellate court, raised the 
affirmative defense of qualified immunity for the first time on appeal.  The 
general, guiding principle for this part of the rule is that an appellate court 
should only permit the defendant to raise a waived qualified immunity 
defense for the first time on appeal if doing so would not cause undue 
hardship or prejudice to the plaintiff.332  This is because allowing an 
affirmative defense to be raised for the first time on appeal is already a 
departure from basic principles of civil procedure.333 
At step one, a court must make a threshold determination:  whether the 
qualified immunity analysis would involve a purely legal question.334  If 
additional facts must be found, the court must automatically decline to 
consider the issue for the first time on appeal.  If it is a purely legal question, 
the court may proceed to step two. 
At step two, the court must determine the stage of the litigation.  Because 
a central goal of qualified immunity is to prevent a government official from 
enduring the burdens of discovery and trial,335 it is appropriate to determine 
whether these benefits have been lost and whether the burdens of litigation 
have become a sunk cost.  Under this Note’s proposed rule, an appellate court 
would only be allowed to permit a defendant to raise a qualified immunity 
defense for the first time on appeal at the pleadings or motion to dismiss stage 
of the litigation before discovery is taken.336  If the defense is raised after 
these stages, it is waived and cannot be raised for any other stage of the 
litigation.  By then, the benefits of qualified immunity, which are to “avoid 
‘subject[ing] government officials . . . to the burdens of broad-reaching 
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discovery,’” have been lost and the burdens sought to be avoided by qualified 
immunity are already a sunk cost.337 
This proposed rule is sound for several reasons.  First, it is consistent with 
the original goals of the qualified immunity doctrine.  Permitting a qualified 
immunity defense to be raised at, say, the summary judgment stage after 
discovery has been taken338 would be counterproductive.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in Harlow specifically eliminated the subjective good faith 
requirement because determining good faith “may entail broad-ranging 
discovery . . . [and] [i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of 
effective government.”339  If the current qualified immunity doctrine is 
premised on objective factors specifically to avoid time-consuming and 
distracting discovery, it is incongruous for the doctrine to provide that same 
protection after discovery has already been taken.340 
This Note’s proposed rule is also consistent with the nature of affirmative 
defenses.  Allowing an appellate court from raising qualified immunity sua 
sponte when no party has raised the issue would force the conclusion that the 
defendant admits to the allegations of the plaintiff’s prima facie case without 
the defendant’s consent.341  Additionally, an affirmative defense is a 
privilege by which a defendant can avoid liability on grounds outside the 
merits of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, but a defendant must admit to the 
allegations of the plaintiff’s prima facie case to benefit from that privilege.342  
If the defendant does not take advantage of that privilege at an early stage in 
the litigation to avoid being subject to discovery—which is one of the 
primary goals of qualified immunity343—the court should presume that the 
defendant has consented to endure these burdens.  Finally, allowing some 
leeway as to when the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is waived is 
consistent with the permissive approach courts take with regard to allowing 
defendants to preserve affirmative defenses, so long as the plaintiff is not 
prejudiced.344 
Finally, this Note’s proposed rule is in accord with our adversarial 
system’s principle of party representation.  First, any sua sponte action by an 
appellate court, where the lower court did not act on an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal, is naturally incongruous with the writ of error model, 
which undergirds the legal system.345  If qualified immunity is raised sua 
sponte for the first time on appeal, no error could have been made by the 
lower court regarding qualified immunity (because the lower court did not 
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decide the issue ab initio), and there is naturally no error for the appellate 
court to correct.346  In sum, this approach is consistent with the current 
practices of appellate courts raising issues for the first time on appeal347 and 
stays true to the adversarial model in American law where the courts only 
“decide . . . questions presented by the parties.”348 
B.  The Sunk Costs Test Supports Public Policy 
This Note’s proposed rule avoids many issues caused by appellate courts 
raising issues sua sponte.  First and foremost, raising qualified immunity sua 
sponte can greatly impair judicial efficiency.349  In Hamner, Judge Steven 
M. Colloton observed that efficiency was an important reason for raising 
qualified immunity sua sponte.350 
Judge Colloton may be right in the short term.  A potential short-term 
benefit of raising an issue sua sponte on appeal is that the trial court saves 
some time by not considering the issue below.351  Other than this potentially 
minimal benefit, the more likely results of raising an issue sua sponte on 
appeal are net neutral at best and, at worst, catastrophic for judicial 
efficiency.352  At best, the appellate court considers the new issue on appeal 
and affirms the trial court, requiring no additional work for the trial court.353  
At worst, a new issue raised on appeal can result in the reversal of the trial 
court’s decision and remand for further proceedings, which is time-
consuming and costly for the litigants, trial court, and appellate court.354  
Regardless, the appellate court considering an issue for the first time on 
appeal must expend time and resources deciding whether to consider the new 
issue in the first place and, if so, analyzing its merits.355 
Additionally, it would be more efficient for courts to force defendant-
public officials to raise the qualified immunity defense in the lower court.356  
If defendants are incentivized to raise qualified immunity below as early as 
possible, the trial court can analyze and apply the qualified immunity defense 
early on and dismiss the case before judicial resources are expended during 
discovery, trial, and appeal.  Moreover, the immediate appealability of a 
qualified immunity determination mitigates any risk to the defendant of the 
trial court erroneously denying the defense.357  In fact, the Supreme Court 
has held that defendants are entitled to multiple interlocutory appeals when 
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qualified immunity is denied at various stages of the litigation, including the 
motion to dismiss stage.358  Thus, the defendant has multiple avenues through 
which to avoid an adverse denial of qualified immunity, and appellate courts 
should allow trial courts to wade through these arguments and avoid wasteful 
appeals and remands. 
In addition, raising qualified immunity sua sponte can create 
unpredictability, which also decreases judicial efficiency.359  For example, if 
litigants see that issues are being raised sua sponte, they may begin to enter 
facts into the record in advance to prepare for potential arguments that will 
be raised for the first time on appeal.360  This practice is time-consuming, 
confusing, and wasteful if the particular issues that litigants are concerned 
about are not actually raised sua sponte on appeal.  Appellate courts that 
routinely raise issues sua sponte can also encourage defendants to take 
appeals more often, causing parties to become less scrupulous about raising 
affirmative defenses in a timely fashion in the hope that the appellate court 
will just raise the otherwise waived affirmative defense sua sponte later 
on.361 
Finally, and most importantly, qualified immunity is incredibly difficult 
for civil rights plaintiffs to overcome.362  Allowing appellate courts to raise 
qualified immunity sua sponte can introduce a dispositive affirmative 
defense for defendant-public officials when neither party raised the issue, 
which can create enormous injustice.  Graves is emblematic of this issue.363  
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Graves found that the defendant-
police officer actually violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.364  The 
court, however, raised qualified immunity sua sponte and ruled in favor of 
the defendant-police officer anyway.365  This case highlights the very danger 
of an appellate court raising an issue sua sponte, especially in the context of 
qualified immunity:  plaintiffs can have a potential victory taken away from 
them by an appellate court raising a dispositive affirmative defense sua 
sponte.366  Had the Graves court refrained from raising qualified immunity 
sua sponte, the plaintiff likely would have recovered against the police 
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officer.367  Instead, the court’s sua sponte action took away the plaintiff’s 
victory.368 
Regardless of these rationales, courts should not prioritize bare policy 
interests of preserving judicial resources when doing so would (1) ignore 
potential civil rights violations and (2) contravene basic principles of civil 
procedure.369  There are also multiple safeguards that can assist defendants 
in preserving their affirmative defenses.370  It is therefore incongruous to 
allow appellate judges to raise qualified immunity sua sponte and hand 
defendant-public officials a dispositive affirmative defense when the FRCP 
and accompanying case law are already lenient to defendants who fail to raise 
their affirmative defenses appropriately.371  Allowing appellate courts simply 
to raise affirmative defenses on appeal, especially qualified immunity—a 
high legal hurdle for plaintiffs to clear—may further evince a prodefendant 
bent among federal courts adjudicating civil rights cases.372 
C.  Legislative Alternatives 
In the wake of the murder of George Floyd in May of 2020 by a 
Minneapolis police officer,373 a bipartisan proposal to eliminate the qualified 
immunity doctrine was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives.374  
While the proposed bill certainly resolves many legal issues with the 
qualified immunity doctrine generally, it remains unclear whether it will 
prevent future abuses of power by public officials.375  Moreover, police 
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officers, even if they are found civilly liable in a § 1983 suit, “virtually never 
pay” damages because they are either indemnified by their police department 
employers; plaintiffs choose to sue the municipality over the defendant-
officer; or their legal fees are reimbursed by insurance policies, the police 
department’s municipality, or a police union.376  Thus, it remains unclear 
whether abolishing qualified immunity wholesale will remedy the ills of 
police brutality. 
Statistical evidence, moreover, shows that the underlying goals of 
qualified immunity are largely not achieved.  First, qualified immunity’s 
principal goal of preventing public officials from enduring the burdens of 
discovery is often not met.377  As discussed above in Part I.A.3, a study of 
close to 1200 federal district court opinions in qualified immunity cases 
found that just 0.6 percent of those cases were dismissed prior to the 
discovery phase of the litigation.378  Second, the other goal of qualified 
immunity—ensuring that the threat of personal liability does not deter public 
officials from performing their jobs effectively—is also questionable.  
Specifically, police officers “virtually never pay” damages in § 1983 suits, 
as they are either judgment-proof, indemnified, or their attorney’s fees are 
reimbursed.379  Thus, legislation eliminating qualified immunity might 
therefore rid the judiciary of a confusing and complicated legal doctrine, 
while avoiding the dire consequences many proponents of qualified 
immunity fear would occur if it were abolished.380 
CONCLUSION 
The legal deck of cards is stacked against civil rights plaintiffs when they 
encounter the qualified immunity doctrine.  It makes sense that the doctrine 
is an affirmative defense, because the law wants to ensure that defendants 
use this privilege appropriately.  When defendants do not use this privilege 
appropriately, however, the general rule is that an affirmative defense is 
waived.  In a party representation system of justice, this general rule is a 
benefit civil rights plaintiffs ought to reap.  When an appellate court revives 
a waived qualified immunity defense, it can very well slam the courtroom 
door shut on civil rights plaintiffs at any stage of the litigation.  At the same 
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time, however, it is long-standing practice for appellate courts to raise waived 
issues sua sponte.  This Note is mindful of these competing interests and aims 
to strike a middle ground, with an eye toward the goal of the qualified 
immunity doctrine:  preventing public officials from enduring painstaking 
discovery and litigation that can affect their ability to do their jobs.  Thus, 
this Note proposes a two-part solution that permits courts to raise a waived 
qualified immunity defense but only at the pleadings stage.  This Note’s 
proposal will likely promote judicial efficiency and refocus the qualified 
immunity doctrine on its original purpose—without gutting the doctrine 
wholesale—while providing greater protection for civil rights plaintiffs.  
Finally, and most importantly, this Note’s proposal will prevent civil rights 
plaintiffs from losing hard-fought legal battles to vindicate their 
constitutional rights just because a waived defense was raised sua sponte late 
in the game. 
